基于对湖南省G村一起农民偏执型上访事件的历时性考察，通过上访各阶段“政府——访民”行为互动关系的比较分析，发现上级政府——基层政府——上访者三大行动主体构成的信访治理链条中，存在着治理实效偏离政策预期的“逆向激励”效应。信访治理中，上级政府基于“公共性”的秩序追求对基层政府“自利性”的“避责”思维具有一定程度的“逆向激励”，从而给上访者提供了谋利空间，基层政府的“软肋”成为上访者得以借用的“机会”。成功谋利上访的示范效应结合上访谋利空间，促成农民上访的延续与扩展，并最终导致偏执型上访的生成，这与信访制度的初衷相背离。建议通过信访治理与基层稳控的逐渐剥离、信访分类治理考评机制的建立以及乡村自治力量的充分动员与发挥，有效规制信访激励的“逆向空间”。

Based on the diachronic investigation of a farmer paranoid petition event in G village, Hunan Province, through a comparative analysis of the behavioral interaction between the government and the petitioners at each stage of the petition, the paper finds that a ‘reverse incentive’ effect in which the effectiveness of governance deviates from the policy expectation exists in the petition governance chain composed of the three main actors: higher-level government, primary-level government and petitioners. In petition governance, the order pursuit of ‘publicity’ of the higher-level government somewhat acts as a ‘reverse incentive’ to the primary-level government’s thinking of ‘responsibility avoiding’ and self- interest, thereby providing the petitioners space for profit, and the primary-level government’s weakness becoming ‘profitable opportunity’ for petitioners. The demonstrative effect of successful petitioning for profit, combined with the space for profit, contributes to the continuation and expansion of petitioning, and finally led to the generation of paranoid petition, which deviated from the original intention of petitioning system. It is suggested that the reverse space of petition incentive can be regulated effectively through the gradual separating petition governance from primary- level stability control, establishing classified petition evaluation system and fully mobilizing and giving full play to rural autonomous forces.

D035.5