基于隐性晋升激励和财政支出视角，利用2000—2018年面板数据评估了扶贫改革试验区设立对相对贫困的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：丽水扶贫改革试验区的设立显著减少了相对贫困，且随着时间的延长，其减少相对贫困的作用逐渐增强；阜新、清远、宿迁、淄博和三明扶贫改革试验区的设立未显著减少相对贫困；进一步分析表明，官员视察带来的隐性晋升激励的差异是扶贫改革试验区相对贫困减少绩效存在差异的原因；隐性晋升激励通过促使扶贫改革试验区加大对医疗卫生、社会保障以及农林水务财政支出，保障了健康扶贫、社会保障扶贫、产业扶贫政策的有效执行进而作用于相对贫困的减少；官员任期结束后职位变动的统计数据表明，相对贫困的减少似乎有助于其晋升。因此，扶贫开发支出分权可能仅适用于财力较强的地方政府，在扶贫开发事权下放的同时还应完善地方官员的晋升激励机制，从而建立后脱贫时代缓解相对贫困的长效机制。

This article evaluates the impact and operation mechanism of establishing poverty alleviation reform pilot zone (PARPZ) on relative poverty from the perspective of implicit promotion incentive and financial expenditure based on the panel data from 2000 to 2018. The result suggests that the establishment of Lishui PARPZ has significantly alleviated relative poverty with effect gradually salient over time while that of Fuxin, Qingyuan, Suqian, Zibo, Sanming PARPZs failed. Further analysis shows that the differences in implicit promotion incentive made by official inspection lead to performance difference in alleviating relative poverty in the PARPZ. The implicit promotion incentive ensures the effective implementation of alleviating poverty through programs such as health care, social security and developing industries and businesses in order to reduce the relative poverty by facilitating the PARPZs to increase financial expenditure in medical and health care, social security, agriculture, forestry and water affairs. The statistics of an official’s position change at the end of his/her term indicates that reducing relative poverty is liable to facilitate the official’s promotion. Hence, decentralization of poverty alleviation and development expenditure might be merely applicable to local governments with strong financial resources. The promotion incentive mechanism of local officials should be improved in devolving the power of poverty alleviation and development so as to establish a long-term mechanism to alleviate relative poverty in the post poverty era.

C912.82；G479