以2011—2020年深市A股上市公司为研究样本，综合运用多分类Ologit模型、Logit回归模型与泊松模型，实证检验分析师关注对企业违规行为的影响，并探讨其作用机制。研究发现：分析师关注能够降低企业违规倾向、减少企业违规次数，有效抑制企业违规行为；信息透明度在分析师关注与企业违规行为之间发挥部分中介效应。进一步研究表明，在非国有控股、内部控制较差、审计质量较低的上市公司中，分析师关注对企业违规行为的抑制作用更加显著。为加强企业合规监管和投资者保护，建议监管部门进一步完善分析师制度，以保证分析师的独立性和提升分析师关注的质量。

Taking the 2011-2020 Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a research sample, based on the multi-class ologit model, logit regression model and Poisson model, this paper empirically tests the impact of analysts’ concerns on corporate violations and discusses its mechanism in depth. The study found that analyst attention can reduce the tendency of companies to violate regulations, reduce the number of corporate violations, and effectively suppress corporate violations; information transparency plays a part of the intermediary role between analyst attention and corporate violations. Further research shows that among listed companies with non-state-controlled holdings, poor internal control, and low audit quality, analysts’ attentions have a more significant inhibitory effect on corporate violations. The research conclusions provide new ideas for strengthening corporate governance and investor protection. It is recommended that regulatory authorities further improve the analyst system to ensure the independence of analysts and improve the quality of analysts’ attention.

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