中央环保督察推进了我国环保工作的有效开展。以K县Y流域治污为案例，阐释环保督察如何影响地方政府实现长效治污的逻辑，即“鲶鱼效应”：一方面是中央环保督察施加的各种压力对地方政府治污产生负向激励影响；另一方面是地方政府在治污过程中采用运动式治理“嵌入”科层组织，解决了以往常规治理失灵的困境。透过“战略—结构—绩效”模型分析发现，县政府在省级压力传导、中央压力触底、央地权威叠加背景下选择了不同治理策略，最终通过领导小组机制推动横向组织调适和纵向权力贯穿实现了治污绩效的稳定性。因此，环保督察不仅要发挥其监管和激励的作用，还应该适当引导地方政府完善环境治理实践机制，充分发挥环保督察的积极作用。

The central environmental inspectors have promoted the effective implementation of environmental protection in China. Using the case of pollution control in watershed Y of County K, we explain how environmental inspectors influence the local governments to achieve the logic of long-term pollution control - the "catfish effect": on the one hand, the various pressures exerted by the central environmental inspectors on local governments to address pollution has a negative incentive effect; on the other hand, during the process of pollution control, the local government uses mobilized governance "embedded" in the bureaucracy, which has solved the dilemma of the routine governance failure in the past. Through "Strategy-Structure-Performance" model analysis, it is found that the county governments chose different governance strategies in the context of provincial pressure transmission, central pressure bottoming out, and overlapping central and local authority. Finally, by promoting horizontal organizational adaptation and vertical power penetration through the leadership group mechanism, stabile pollution control performance is achieved. Therefore, environmental inspectors should not only play their regulatory and incentive roles, but also properly guide local governments to improve practice mechanisms of environmental governance and give full play to the positive role of environmental inspectors.

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