我国过去以“连续亏损”为核心的退市制度加剧了控股股东利用“洗大澡”保壳的现象。以2007—2023年A股上市公司的相关数据为研究样本，实证检验了“洗大澡”对公司高管薪酬粘性的影响。研究发现：与其他公司相比，实施“洗大澡”的上市公司具有更强的高管薪酬粘性。异质性检验结果显示：在管理层独立性较强、壳资源定价较高、高管持股比例较低以及在职消费水平较低的样本公司中，“洗大澡”对高管薪酬粘性的影响更为显著。研究结果为监管部门深化注册制改革、上市公司完善薪酬治理提供了理论支撑与经验证据。

In the past, China’s profit–based delisting rules have driven controlling shareholders to use “big bath” accounting as a strategy to maintain listing status. Using data from A–share listed companies from 2007 to 2023, this paper empirically examines how “big bath” accounting affect executive compensation stickiness. Baseline regression results show that companies conducting “big bath” accounting show higher executive compensation stickiness than those that do not. Heterogeneity tests further reveal that this impact is more significant in firms with stronger managerial independence, higher shell resource valuation, lower executive shareholding ratios, and lower levels of perquisite consumption. These findings provide theoretical support and empirical evidence for regulatory authorities to deepen registration–based reforms and for listed companies to improve their compensation governance.

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安徽省社科规划重点项目（AHSKZ2021D14）